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Brown v. Abbott Laboratories and Strict
Products Liability
J. Clark Kelso*
In Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.' the Supreme Court
of California helped lead the country into the wonderland of strict
products liability. That court has now rendered a decision 2 that, by
its clear explication of why strict products liability should not apply
to prescription drugs, demonstrates with equal clarity that products
liability should not be viewed as a species of strict liability. Instead,
products liability should be viewed as a hybrid of negligence and
warranty law. This thesis-that strict products liability is not so
strict-is not particularly novel. 3 Indeed, this exact observation was
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law.
J.D., 1983, Columbia University School of Law. The author wishes to thank Professor Charles
D. Kelso of McGeorge School of Law and Professor R. Randall Kelso of the South Texas
College of Law for reviewing a draft of this article.
1. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
2. Brown v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 751 P.2d 470, 245 Cal. Rptr. 412 (1988)
(Abbott Laboratories).
3. See, e.g., Wade, On the Effect in Product Liability of Knowledge Unavailable Prior
to Marketing, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 734, 760-61 (1983); Powers, The Persistence of Fault in
Products Liability, 61 TEX. L. REv. 777 (1983); Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design
Defect: From Negligence to Warranty to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REv. 593
(1980); Hoenig, Product Designs and Strict Tort Liability: Is There A Better Approach, 8 Sw.
U.L. REv. 109 (1976); Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss.
L.J. 825, 850 (1973).
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made at the 1962 meeting of the American Law Institute during its
second consideration of Section 402A of the Second Restatement of
Torts. 4 Although the thesis is not new, the California Supreme
Court's decision in Brown v. Superior Court (Abbott Laboratories),5
makes this an appropriate time to reevaluate the place of products
liability in the law of torts and to reconsider the table of contents
of our torts casebooks. 6
There are of course cases in which courts, because they assume
that products liability is or should be strict liability, craft rules of
liability that are more or less consistent with the assumption. 7 And
if strict liability could be theoretically justified by legitimate interests,
these cases would be properly decided. But, as explained below, the
reasons advanced to support strict liability are either overbroad or
underbroad and thus provide no firm support for the conclusion that
manufacturers should be strictly liable for injuries caused by their
products. Moreover, a review of California law shows plainly that
the attempt to excise negligence and fault concepts from products
liability has been a fruitless exercise.
4. At the beginning of the 1962 ALI proceedings, Mr. William Condon, representing the
Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Law Section of the New York State Bar Association, made the
following critical observations:
I am here to suggest that 402A, in the judgment of our Committee and our Section,
does not restate existing law. It rather announces a rule of law which we are unable
to discern from the cases.
Now, all of the cases that I have been able to find and all of the cases that I have
read have been cited by the Reporter in the comments here. Each of them is a case
in which courts in some way or another have made inroads toward the abolition of
the privity requirements in cases involving breach of implied warranty.
Now, there is no doubt that perhaps the majority of our jurisdictions have abolished
or modified the privity requirement in some respects with respect to food products,
other products for intimate bodily use, and in some cases for products which are
not connected with bodily use at all in an intimate way.
This is quite a different thing, however, from saying that those courts have held
that there is a strict court liability.
39 A.L.I. PROC. 230-31 (1963). The only reply to these observations was from Mr. Laurence
Eldredge who, quite inaccurately, described what the courts had been doing as using "a dozen
different devices to get this rule of absolute liability." Id. at 233 (emphasis added). Not even
Section 402A purported to impose absolute liability, however.
5. 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 751 P.2d 470, 245 Cal. Rptr. 412 (1988).
6. Products liability is generally given a chapter of its own after the students have
finished negligence and strict liability. That chapter usually emphasizes the development from
negligence to warranty to strict liability. See, e.g., M. FRANKLIN & R. RABIN, TORT LAW AND
ALTERNATIVES xxx (4th ed. 1987); R. EPSTEIN, C. GREGORY & H. KALVEN, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON TORTS xxxv (4th ed. 1984); P. KEETON, R. KEETON, L. SAROENTICH & H.
STEINER, TORT AND ACCIDENT LAW xxv (1983); W. PROSSER, J. WADE & V. SCHWARTZ, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON TORTS xxvii (7th ed. 1982). The author believes that students would be
much less confused by products liability if we would teach products liability as a special part
of negligence instead of teaching it as an entirely separate field of tort law.
7. See, e.g., Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982)
(rejecting state-of-the-art defense primarily because products liability is strict liability).
The Supreme Court of New Jersey, reacting to criticism of its decision in Beshada, has
now explicitly limited Beshada to its facts. See Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 479 A.2d 374, 388
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If products liability is not strict liability, then what have we
accomplished by its supposed creation as strict liability? History is
likely to view the creation and development of products liability in
much the same way that we now view the development of certain
common law writs. When procedural or substantive limitations im-
posed by existing writs proved too constrictive, lawyers and courts
made free use of fictions to fit a new state of facts into a pre-
existing mold.'
Products liability has a similar pedigree: desperate attorneys and
sympathetic courts, unable in a particular case to avail themselves
of more traditional principles and causes of action (i.e., negligence
and warranty), created a new doctrine with a new name. Along with
the new name came the opportunity to change the law. Time honored
limitations on other causes of action could be avoided since the new
cause of action was, if nothing else, new in name.
Although the theme of this article is that products liability has
been strict in name only, that should not be interpreted as a criticism
of all of the new rules courts have developed by invoking the magic
phrase "strict products liability." Fictions are an indispensable fea-
ture of legal development, and when a court resorts to a fiction, it
often is in response to a genuinely sympathetic claim. 9 Fictions allow
growth to proceed in the context of a relatively rigid framework.
The rigid framework provides stability and predictability that the
practitioner in the office needs to have and provides a measure of
legitimacy to the decision of an individual judge. Fictions then are
the means by which that rigid framework can be modified from the
inside out-modified without tearing down the whole structure.
Professor Lon Fuller described the primary motive that lay behind
the introduction of a fiction as follows: "to reconcile a specific legal
result with some premise or postulate."' 0 In the context of products
(N.J. 1984). The defendant in a failure to warn case in New Jersey is now deemed to have
knowledge only of "reliable information generally available or reasonably obtainable in the
industry or in the particular field involved." Id. at 387.
8. The classic example given by Professor Lon Fuller in his leading work on legal fictions
is the common law action for trover. "The English courts were in the habit of pretending
that a chattel, which might in fact have been taken from the plaintiff by force, had been
found by the defendant. Why? In order to allow an action which otherwise would not have
lain." L. FULLER, LEGAL FiCTIONs 6 (1967).
9. See, e.g., Soifer, Reviewing Legal Fictions, 20 GA. L. Rav. 871 (1986). Acknowledging
that Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), moved the law a step in the right
direction, Soifer further notes that Brown's companion case, Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497
(1954), was based on a double legal fiction: "because the alternative was 'unthinkable,' the
due process clause of the fifth amendment performed reverse incorporation of equal protection
doctrine from the fourteenth amendment and made Brown applicable to the federal govern-
ment." Id. at 878 n.24.
10. Id. at 51. See also Soifer, supra note 9, at 874-79.
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liability, the unstated premise is that, as a general matter, all negli-
gence cases should be governed by the same basic set of substantive
and procedural rules. The fiction that products liability is fundamen-
tally different from negligence permits a court to create new rules
(for example, that in a products case, the defendant has the burden
of proving that its product was reasonably designed" or that con-
tributory negligence is no defense' 2) without violating the unstated
premise. The fiction thereby makes us feel comfortable about the
legitimacy of the new rules.
But the unstated premise-that every negligence or warranty case
should be judged by the same rules of proof as every other negligence
or warranty case-is misguided; and if we recognize that fact, the
fiction that products liability is strict liability will no longer be
necessary. Simply put, there i no reason why every negligence or
warranty action must be governed by the same rules as every other
negligence and warranty action. Indeed, courts had used modified
warranty principles in products cases for over half a century before
"strict" products liability was created. 3
The intellectually difficult task is to determine which products cases
should be governed by different rules and what those rules should
be. The fiction that products liability is strict liability permits us to
be intellectually lazy in that regard, and the price we pay for that
laziness is the imposition of liability in cases where no one in the
manufacturing or distribution chain is at fault. Dropping the fiction
that products liability is strict liability will have the advantages of
(1) fostering a return to fault-based liability and (2) allowing courts
to focus on real differences between a particular products suit and
other negligence or warranty actions-differences that may well jus-
tify giving the plaintiff the benefit of special rules of proof. 14
11. See, e.g., Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr.
225 (1978).
12. Lugue v. McLean, 8 Cal. 3d 136, 145, 501 P.2d 1163, 1169-70, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443,
449-50 (1972).
13. Although the majority of courts were apparently comfortable using modified warranty
principles, a few judges and leading commentators were not. They viewed certain limitations
on warranty actions-such as the requirement that the buyer give notice to the seller of a
breach of a warranty within a reasonable time after the buyer knew or ought to have known
of the breach-as unjustifiable. Dean Prosser, in particular, lobbied long and hard to excise
the word "warranty" from our products liability vocabulary. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel
(Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REv. 791 (1966) [hereinafter The Fall of the
Citadel]; Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960).
14. See, e.g., Wade, On the Effect in Product Liability of Knowledge Unavailable Prior
to Marketing, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 734, 760-61 (1983). Although the author does not fully
subscribe to some of the new rules that have been created, see infra note 81, the primary
purpose of this article is not to challenge the new rules but, rather, to make the adoption of
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This article reviews the historical development of strict products
liability in California. The review will make it plain that strict
products liability-even in the state which made the greatest effort
to distinguish products liability from negligence and warranty-is
really nothing more than a modified form of negligence and warranty.
The modifications concern mostly procedural matters (such as the
burden of proof or availability of presumptions) or defenses (such
as the availability of contributory negligence) and not the underlying
theory of liability-a fault-based theory of liability. The modifications
are important, of course, and even if we recognize that products
liability is not premised on strict liability, those modifications can
remain intact.
As scholars, we would well serve students, practitioners, courts,
and the public if we were to begin debunking the notion that products
liability is either strict or absolute. In addition to bringing reality
back into the discussion of products liability, debunking the idea
that products liability is strict or absolute may have the positive side
effect of advancing and clarifying somewhat the debate over certain
tort reform measures. One of the persistent drumbeats of tort re-
formers has been the judicial trend towards no-fault liability.15 If
products liability is in fact fault-based in many jurisdictions, as the
author believes it is, then this drumbeat loses much of its impact.
I. THE THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY
The theoretical underpinnings of products liability as a distinct
field of strict liability in tort have never been particularly clear. The
reason is simple. None of the suggested bases for products liability
firmly supports the conclusion that products liability must be strict
liability as opposed to either absolute liability, negligence, or breach
of warranty. As shown below, each reason for strict products liability
is either overbroad or underbroad. And when the reasons for a
such new rules depend upon a more careful analysis of possible differences between a products
suit and other negligence actions. An analysis that begins and ends with the statement that
products liability is strict liability is insufficient.
15. See, e.g., TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP, REPORT OF THE TORT POLICY WORKING
GROUP ON THE CAUSES, EXTENT AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE CURRENT CRISIS IN INSURANCE
AvAILABILITY AND AFFORDABILITY 30 (1986). "One of the most disturbing aspects of the current
tort system is the degree to which it has moved toward no-fault liability. While this movement
began in earnest over twenty years ago, it appears to have accelerated dramatically in recent
years." Id.
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particular rule are not narrowly tailored to the boundaries created
by the rule itself, the tension created undermines the rule's legitimacy.
A quick review of the justifications for strict liability will make this
point clear and put the remainder of this Article in proper perspective.
Dean Prosser's leading article in 1965 put forward what is one of
the most widely accepted explanations for strict products liability:
The public interest in human safety requires the maximum possible
protection for the user of the product, and those best able to afford
it are the suppliers of the chattel. By placing their goods upon the
market, the suppliers represent to the public that they are suitable
and safe for use; and by packaging, advertising and otherwise they
do everything they can to induce that belief. The middleman is no
more than a conduit, a mere mechanical device, through which the
thing is to reach the ultimate user. The supplier has invited and
solicited the use; and when it leads to disaster, he should not be
permitted to avoid the responsibility by saying that he made no
contract with the consumer, or that he used all reasonable care. It
is already possible to enforce strict liability by a series of warranty
actions, by the consumer against the retailer, who recovers from
the distributor, and so on back to the manufacturer; but this is an
expensive, time consuming and wasteful process. What is needed is
a shortcut which makes any supplier in the chain liable directly to
the user. The 'risk distributing' theory-the supplier should be held
liable because he is in a position to insure against liability and add
the cost to the price of his product-has been an almost universal
favorite with the professors; but it has received little mention in
the cases, and still appears to play only the part of a makeweight
argument.'
6
Dean Prosser's explanation has been broken down into the follow-
ing four rationales for products liability: (a) The difficulty of a
consumer proving that a manufacturer has been negligent; (b) the
public policy encouraging manufacturers to make safer products; (c)
the expectations of the consumer; and (d) the public policy in favor
of risk-spreading and the internalization of costs.' 7 Even if these
rationales are accepted at their face value, none supports making
16. The Fall of the Citadel, supra note 13, at 799-800.
17. See, e.g., Powers, The Persistence of Fault in Products Liability, 61 TEx. L. REV.
777, 811-13 (1983); Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J.
30, 34-35 (1973); Keeton, Products Liability-Inadequacy of Information, 48 TEx. L. REV.
398, 399 (1970); Keeton, Products Liability-Some Observations About Allocation of Risks,
64 MICH. L. REv. 1329, 1333 (1966); Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw.
L.J. 5 (1965). See also R. EPsTEiN, MODERN PRODUcTS LIABILITY LAW 40 (1980).
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products liability strict liability as opposed to fault-based liability or
absolute liability.
A. The Difficulty of Proving Negligence
If it is too difficult for the consumer to prove that the manufacturer
has been negligent, it is relatively easy to change the procedural rules
of proof. For example, the concept of res ipsa loquitur could be
expanded to cover some of the difficult cases in which the plaintiff
cannot identify the manufacturer. 18 Or, if the plaintiff can prove that
a particular design caused plaintiff's injury, the burden of proof
could be shifted to the defendant to prove that its design is not
unreasonably dangerous. 19 Or, if the plaintiff can prove that someone
in the distribution chain was at fault, the plaintiff should be permitted
to bring suit against anyone in the distribution chain, with the burden
again on each defendant to exculpate itself.2o All of these innovations
can take place without strict liability.
Prosser himself expressed doubt that the claimed difficulty in
proving a negligence case against the manufacturer was a substantial
concern. He correctly perceived that much of the force behind the
strict products liability movement was not directed at the original
manufacturer, who Prosser believed would usually lose under a
negligence claim in almost every case where strict products liability
would apply. Instead, the target was the other participants in the
distribution chain, who usually could not be found liable on a
negligence theory because they did nothing other than distribute
goods. As Prosser noted:
The manufacturer is often beyond the jurisdiction. He may even,
in some cases, be unknown. If he is identified and can be sued, it
is very often impossible to pin the liability upon him. Even where
there is a proved defect which speaks of obvious negligence on the
18. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132
(1980) (permitting plaintiffs to proceed with products liability action against five DES manu-
facturers who represented a substantial percentage of the market even though plaintiffs could
not identify source of particular drug each plaintiff took).
19. Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
But see infra note 81.
20. Cf. Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948) (shifting burden of proof to
defendants when both simultaneously engaged in conduct that could have injured plaintiff and
plaintiff could not prove which defendant actually caused injury); Ybarra v. Spangard, 25
Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944) (employing res ipsa loquitur in a hospital injury case against
defendants, each of whom, at one time or another, had control over plaintiff's care).
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part of someone, it may still not be possible to prove that it was
on the part of the maker .
2
Because of these possible difficulties, Prosser reasoned, "[i]f the
plaintiff is to recover at all, he must often look to the wholesaler,
the jobber, and the retailer." 22 This argument, of course, begs the
essential question. The question is not whether the plaintiff should
recover "at all," but whether the plaintiff should be permitted to
recover from someone who was not at fault and whether the plaintiff
should be permitted to recover when no one, not even the manufac-
turer, was at fault. That, after all, is the fundamental difference
between strict liability and negligence. As Professor Epstein has
noted, we may be permitted to distrust an argument that A should
recover against B because A cannot recover against C.23
B. Public Policy Encouraging Manufacturers to Make Safer
Products
There unquestionably is a public policy encouraging manufacturers
to make safer products, but that policy is not furthered by strict
liability. Strict liability is imposed even if the manufacturer did
nothing wrong-even if the manufacturer did everything that was
reasonable to avoid the injury. Imposing liability when the manufac-
turer has been reasonable does little to encourage manufacturers to
do a better job in the future since the whole basis of strict liability
is that liability is imposed even though the manufacturer could not
reasonably have done a better job. Moreover, as Prosser noted:
A skeptic may well question whether the callous manufacturer, who
is unmoved by the prospect of negligence liability, plus res ipsa
loquitur, and by the effect of any injury whatever upon the repu-
tation of his goods, will really be stimulated by the relatively slight
increase in possible liability to tqke additional precautions against
defects which cannot be prevented by only reasonable care.
24
C. Consumer Expectations
Courts are legitimately concerned about protecting the expectations
of consumers. But those expectations are fully protected in an action
21. The Assault Upon the Citadel, supra note 13, at 1116.
22. Id. at 1117.
23. R. Epsm't, supra note 17, at 62.
24. The Assault Upon the Citadel, supra note 13, at 1119.
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based on breach of the implied warranty of merchantability. 25 In
light of the death of privity in this context,2 6 and the relaxation of
other warranty rules,27 strict liability as a separate theory of recovery
is quite unnecessary.
D. Public Policy Favoring Risk-Spreading
Finally, if the risk-spreading rationale were fully accepted, then
there would be absolute liability rather than strict liability, The idea
of risk-spreading is that the cost of the product should reflect all
injuries caused by the product, and the manufacturer is in the best
position to insure against those losses and spread the cost of insurance
to consumers. To implement this policy, it would be necessary to
impose absolute liability so that the price of a product would most
accurately reflect the cost to society. Yet no court has gone so far
as to impose absolute liability on a manufacturer, and it is com-
monplace for courts and commentators to mouth the phrase "man-
ufacturers are not insurers of their products." 28 So risk-spreading is,
at best, only a partial justification for strict liability.
With such flimsy conceptual underpinnings, it should come as no
surprise that the creation of strict products liability historically had
little to do with real policy choices. Instead, the new idea of strict
products liability was originally introduced by highly respected law-
yers in cases where it really Was not necessary, and it carried the day
25. Indeed, the Supreme Court of California has recognized that the consumer expectation
text is firmly rooted in the law of warranty. Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co,, 20 Cal, 3d at 429-30,
573 P.2d at 443, 143 Cal, Rptr. at 236.
26. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402B.
27. See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 61, 377 P.2d 897,
900, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 700 (1963) (holding that the plaintiff in a products liability action
need not give the manufacturer notice of a breach of warranty within a reasonable time).
28. See, e.g., Brown v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 751 P.2d 470, 245 Cal. Rptr.
412 (1988) (Abbott Laboratories); SDR Co. v. Federal Ins. Co., 196 Cal. App. 3d 1433, 242
Cal. Rptr. 534 (1987); Collins v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 195 Cal. App. 3d 1539, 231
Cal. Rptr. 396 (1986); Becker v. IRM Corp., 38 Cal. 3d 454, 698 P.2d 116, 213 Cal. Rptr.
213 (1985); Cavers v. Cushman Motor Sales, Inc., 95 Cal. App. 3d 338, 157 Cal. Rptr. 142
(1979); McCreery v. Eli Lilly & Co., 87 Cal. App. 3d 77, 150 Cal. Rptr. 730 (1978); Garcia
v. Joseph Vince Co., 84 Cal. App. 3d 868, 148 Cal. Rptr. 843 (1978); Daly v. General Motors
Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978); Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co.,
20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978); Shepard v. Superior Court, 76 Cal.
App. 3d 16, 142 Cal. Rptr. 612 (1977); Henderson v. Harnischfeger Corp., 12 Cal. 3d 663,
527 P.2d 353, 117 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1974); Cravens, Dargan & Co. v. Pacific Indem. Co., Inc.,
29 Cal. App. 3d 594, 105 Cal.Rptr. 607 (1972); Balido v. Improved Mach., Inc., 29 Cal. App.
3d 633, 105 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1972); Kalash v. Los Angeles Ladder Co., 28 P.2d 29 (1932),
rev'd, I Cal. 2d 229, 34 P.2d 481 (1934).
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largely on the reputations of its original authors. In the next section,
that history is recounted.
II. THE HISToRIcAL DEVELOPMENT OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY
A. The Supreme Court of California Takes the Plunge
The creation and development of strict products liability has been
recounted so often, that it has taken on the characteristics of a good
bedtime story. The main characters are the justices of the Supreme
Court of California and the members of the American Law Institute.
The leading figures are household names to any educated lawyer-
Traynor, Prosser, Wade, Keeton. These giants in the law of torts,
through their collective persuasive powers, wrought a revolution in
the law of torts virtually overnight.
The doctrine first appeared in California case law in Justice Roger
Traynor's concurring opinion in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.
29
It then appeared as an alternative holding in Greenman v. Yuba
Power Products, Inc.30 It was subsequently adopted in modified form
by the American Law Institute in Section 402A of the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS. 3' It then swept the country. Shortly after Green-
man was decided and Section 402A was adopted, Prosser confidently
pronounced the game over.
32
In Escola, an exploding bottle case, Justice Traynor suggested in
a concurring opinion that a manufacturer should be held absolutely
liable for putting a defective product on the market if the manufac-
turer knew the product would be used without additional tests. 33 He
explained his rationale as follows:
Those who suffer injury from defective products are unprepared to
meet its consequences. The cost of an injury and the loss of time
or health may be an overwhelming misfortune to the person injured,
and a needless one, for the risk of injury can be insured by the
manufacturer and distributed among the public as a cost of doing
business. It is to the public interest to discourage the marketing of
products having defects that are a menace to the public. If such
29. 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944).
30. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
31. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A.
32. The Fall of the Citadel, supra note 13, at 804.
33. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (1944)
(Traynor, J., concurring).
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products nevertheless find their way into the market it is to the
public interest to place the responsibility for whatever injury they
may cause upon the manufacturer, who, even if he is not negligent
in the manufacture of the product, is responsible for its reaching
the market. However intermittently such injuries may occur and
however haphazardly they may strike, the risk of their occurrence
is a constant risk and a general one. Against such a risk there
should be general and constant protection and the manufacturer is
best situated to afford such protection.
3 4
Justice Traynor's absolute liability was only partially followed in
Greenman when the Supreme Court of California, with Traynor as
the author, adopted strict products liability. Greenman itself is an
interesting tale. It was a disfigured case-a case that, with better
lawyering, never would have reached the Supreme Court of Califor-
nia.
The plaintiff received a Shopsmith from his wife as a Christmas
present. While using the Shopsmith as a lathe, the plaintiff was
severely injured when the wood being sculpted flew out of the
machine. The plaintiff brought an action against both the retailer
and manufacturer for negligence and breach of warranty-the only
clear bases for liability prior to the decision in Greenman. As to the
manufacturer, the evidence would have justified either a finding of
negligence or a finding that the defendant had breached certain
warranties in a brochure to the plaintiff.
Unfortunately for the plaintiff, he had not given the manufacturer
prompt notice of his claim. The defendant argued that the plaintiff's
cause of action for breach of warranty was therefore barred by
California Civil Code Section 1769 which provided, in relevant part,
that there shall be no liability for breach of a warranty after the
buyer has accepted the goods unless the buyer notifies the seller of
the breach "within a reasonable time after the buyer knows, or ought
to know of such breach." ' '35
The plaintiff's lawyer undoubtedly knew about the problem with
the breach of warranty claim and knew the risk that the claim was
a loser because of the delayed notice. If the jury had been given and
made a separate finding on the negligence cause of action, the
34. Id. at 462, 150 P.2d at 441 (Traynor, J., concurring). Justice Traynor thus clearly
recognized that, as argued above, the risk-spreading justification supports absolute liability
rather than strict liability.
35. Civil Code Section 1769 has been superseded by the adoption in California of the
Uniform Commercial Code. See CAL. CoM. CODE §§ 2512, 2607 (West 1964).
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Supreme Court of California could simply have affirmed the jury's
decision since there was evidence of negligence. But the trial court
did not ask the jury for a special verdict.36 Instead, it requested a
general verdict. As a result, it was impossible to tell whether the jury
had found in favor of the plaintiff on the negligence claim or the
breach of warranty claim.37 California followed the rule that no
judgment can be entered on a general verdict if the general verdict
could have been supported by one of two theories, and only one of
those theories was legally valid. Thus, if the breach of warranty
claim were barred by Civil Code Section 1769, the case would have
had to be reversed since there was no way to determine whether the
jury had found in favor of the plaintiff on the negligence claim or
the legally invalid warranty claim. The failure to secure a special
verdict would have thus made a retrial mandatory.38
The Supreme Court of California saw in Greenman a good op-
portunity to try out its new idea of strict liability. It would have
seemed unfair to the plaintiff to compel a retrial of the case when
the jury had found in the plaintiff's favor. The general verdict rule
was, after all, a mere procedural detail, and the plaintiff should not
be penalized for the failure to secure a separate verdict. In any event,
although the notice rule may have made sense in the context of a
contractual warranty, it made less sense in the context of a personal
injury claim. The question then for the court was, "How can we
affirm the judgment?"
The court first held-in order to give itself room, if necessary, for
a hasty retreat from its alternative holding-that Civil Code Section
1769, despite its clear terms, did not apply to the case since "[a]s
36. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 60, 377 P.2d 897, 899, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697, 699 (1963).
37. Id.
38. This procedural history has sometimes been misstated by commentators. In his leading
article in 1973, for example, Professor Wade described the case as follows: "The trial court
ruled that there was no evidence of negligence and submitted the case to the jury on the basis
of implied warranty. It held for the plaintiff. Rather than reverse for a new trial on the
negligence issue, the Supreme Court held that the recovery on the basis of implied warranty
could be sustained instead on the basis of strict liability." Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort
Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 836 n.39 (1973). Professor Epstein seems to have
made the same mistake in his book. R. EPSTEIN, MODERN PRODUCTs LIABILITY LAW 37 (1980).
The confusion has arisen apparently because there were two defendants in Greenman, the
retailer and the manufacturer. There was no evidence that the retailer was negligent, and the
court properly refused to submit the retailer's negligence to the jury. The jury found in favor
of the retailer on the warranty claim. The jury found against the manufacturer. The manu-
facturer appealed the judgment against it, and the plaintiff conditionally appealed the judgment
in favor of the retailer (that is, the plaintiff appealed if and only if the judgment against the
manufacturer was reversed).
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applied to personal injuries, and notice to a remote seller, [the section]
becomes a booby-trap for the unwary. ' 39 The court's alternative
holding was that, in any event, liability could be imposed without a
showing of either negligence or breach of warranty-notwithstanding
that the case had not been tried on that basis to the jury. A
manufacturer could be found "strictly liable in tort." In particular,
the court noted:
To establish the manufacturer's liability it was sufficient that plain-
tiff proved that he was injured while using the Shopsmith in a way
it was intended to be used as a result of a defect in design and
manufacture of which plaintiff was not aware that made the Shops-
mith unsafe for its intended useA0
Thus began California's journey into strict products liability.
B. The American Law Institute Adds Its Imprimatur
At about the same time as Greenman was working its way up the
California court system, the American Law Institute was actively
considering Section 402A and its comments. Dean Prosser presented
the initial draft of 402A at the Institute's 1961 meeting. The draft
provided:
One engaged in the business of selling food for human consumption
who sells such food in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the consumer is subject to liability for bodily harm thereby
caused to one who consumes it even though
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and
sale of the food, and
(b) the consumer has not bought the food from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller 41
This section restated the law as it had developed over several
centuries. Defective food, no less than mislabeled poisons, was clearly
an area where strict liability made some sense! 2 But Prosser was
already on record in favor of a new principle much broader than
strict liability for defective food.43 Prosser could also point to a few
39. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 61, 377 P.2d 897, 900, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697, 700 (1963).
40. Id. at 64, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701,
41. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1961).
42. RESTATEMENT (SECOtND) OF TORTS § 402A comment b (detailing the history of the
application of strict liability to sellers of food).
43. Prosser had published his first article on products liability in 1959, two years before
the presentation to the Institute. See The Assault on the Citadel, supra note 13.
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cases that had already gone beyond food to cover "products for
intimate bodily use, such as hair dye, cosmetics, permanent wave
solutions, and the like." 44 As a result, a motion passed to include
within Section 402A's scope products that involved "intimate bodily
use.' 
45
There was also a discussion at that first session about the use of
the phrases "defective condition" and "unreasonably dangerous."
Professor Reed Dickerson expressed his belief that 'unreasonably
dangerous' was simply the best possible test for what was legally
defective.' '46 He asked for "an example of a product which was at
the same time unreasonably dangerous but not defective" and moved
to strike the word "defective. '47 Prosser reported that some members
of the Council were concerned that some products, such as whiskey
and cigarettes, might be viewed by a jury as "unreasonably danger-
ous" even though there was nothing "wrong" with the product. The
word "defective" was added "to head off liability on the part of
the seller of whiskey, on the part of the man who consumes it and
gets delirium tremens, even though the jury might find that all
whiskey is unreasonably dangerous to the consumer. '48 Professor
Dickerson's motion to strike the word "defective" was defeated. 49
The Institute also discussed the problem of unavoidably unsafe
products, such as prescription or experimental drugs, that, because
of their importance to society, should not be held to a strict liability
standard. Two motions to add an exemption for prescription drugs
(one motion addressed to the black letter and one to the comments)
were defeated.5 0 There were two reasons for the defeat. First, Prosser
believed it would be difficult to come up with language that would
distinguish between the new experimental drugs, the cure which
somebody will come up with, no doubt, inside of the next fifteen
years which will actually cure cancer, of which there will be an
enormous sale on the market and which will undoubtedly kill its
44. 38 A.L.I. PROC. 55 (1962) [hereinafter 38th ALl PROCEEDINGS]. Professor Joseph
Page has recounted much of the drafting history of Section 402A. See Page, Generic Product
Risks: The Case Against Comment k and for Strict Tort Liability, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 853,
860-72 (1983).
45. 38th ALI PROCEEDINGS, supra note 44, at 73.
46. Id. at 87.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 88.
49. Id. at 89.
50. Id. at 97-98.
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thousands-how do you distinguish that from a new hair dye or
shaving lotion which should not be on the market?51
Second, it was pointed out that, because the draft already required
that a product be both defective and unreasonably dangerous, an
exemption for prescription drugs would mean that a plaintiff could
not recover for injuries caused by a defective and unreasonably
dangerous drug-a result described by one member of the Institute
as "outrageous. "52
When Dean Prosser returned to the Institute two years later, he
had in his hands the Supreme Court of California's decision in
Greenman. With that decision as his primary authority, Dean Prosser
convinced the Institute to scrap what Prosser correctly believed were
artificial limitations in the prior draft of Section 402A. The revised




The draft also contained a new comment k, concerning unavoidably
unsafe products . 4 Although the Institute had been unable to agree
on an exemption for prescription drugs at the 1961 session, Prosser
drafted a comment to address the concerns that he and others had
that the manufacturers of certain unavoidably unsafe drugs (Prosser's
favorite example was the Pasteur treatment for rabies) would be
subject to strict liability. The comment was approved without signif-
icant discussion along with the rest of Section 402A. 51
51. Id. at 93. Prosser also argued that a black-letter exemption for all prescription drugs
was inadvisable because the exemption would then depend upon the vagaries of state law. Id.
at 95-96.
52. Id. at 97. This argument was not correct, of course. The fact that no liability would
attach under § 402A did not mean the drug manufacturer would be exempt from a negligence
action.
53. 41 A.L.I. PROC. 349-51 (1965). Section 402A presently reads as follows:
§ 402A. Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change
in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product,
and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A.
54. See infra text accompanying note 84 (for the text of comment k).
55. See Page, supra note 44, at 864-72 (for an excellent discussion of the history of
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C. The Difference Between Products Liability and Negligence
Because it was a new doctrine with a new name, courts quickly
developed a whole new set of rules for products liability cases. Many
rules were imported intact from negligence and warranty law; many
other rules, however, were made up to further the perceived policies
of products liability.
But courts have never been comfortable with the most fundamental
question of all: what makes products liability different from negli-
gence and warranty as a theory of tort recovery? This question is
fundamental because, if products liability is really nothing more than
negligence and warranty with a new name, then the many decisions
that have assumed there was a difference and have crafted new rules
for products liability are, in some sense, illegitimate.
The Supreme Court of California first struggled with this problem
in Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp.5 6 The precise issue was whether the
jury should be instructed that liability could follow only on a finding
that the product was unreasonably dangerous in addition to being
defective.5 7 Section 402A provided that liability will be imposed on
"[o]ne who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user." It thus appeared that Section 402A mandated
two findings: that a product was defective and that it was also
unreasonably dangerous .
8
Anyone who had participated in the ALI proceedings or who had
read the proceedings knew that, as indicated above, the word "de-
fective" was added to limit liability in certain cases, that the words
"unreasonably dangerous" were supposed to be the central test for
the application of Section 402A, and that the drafters of Section
402A intended that there would indeed be two findings.5 9 Of course
"unreasonably dangerous" sounded quite a bit like negligence. Yet
in explaining Section 402A, Prosser indicated that the "unreasonably
dangerous" requirement was inserted into Section 402A to prevent
comment k). See also infra note 85; Reingold, Products Liability - The Ethical Drug Manu-
facturer's Liability, 18 RurroEs L. REa. 947 (1964).
56. 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972).
57. Cronin, 8 Cal. 3d at 128, 501 P.2d at 1158, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 438.
58. Id. at 133, 501 P.2d at 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 438 (1972).
59. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
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products liability from becoming absolute liability; it was not intended
to make products liability negligence-based 0
The Supreme Court of California was not convinced, however. In
Cronin, the court was concerned that "The result of the limitation,
however, has not been merely to prevent the seller from becoming
an insurer of his products with respect to all harm generated by their
use. Rather, it has burdened the injured plaintiff with proof of an
element which rings of negligence." ' 6' The court was also concerned
that "the Restatement formulation of strict liability in practice rarely
leads to a different conclusion than would have been reached under
laws of negligence.' '62 The court was unwilling to accept this state
of affairs. It declared that "the very purpose of our pioneering
efforts in this field was to relieve the plaintiff from problems of
proof inherent in pursuing negligence ... and warranty ... remedies,
and thereby 'to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from
defective products are borne by the manufacturers.' 63 The court
held that the plaintiff was therefore not required to prove that a
product was unreasonably dangerous. Instead, the plaintiff had to
prove only that the product was defective 4
There was an element of surreality in the court's opinion in Cronin.
The word "defective" in Section 402A was supposed to be a limi-
tation on liability with the words "unreasonably dangerous" being
the key test. Cronin stood Section 402A on its head, discarding
"unreasonably dangerous" and instead focusing on "defective" as
the only test of liability. Of course, no one really knew what it meant
for a product to be "defective.''65 All we knew from the ALI
proceedings was that whiskey and cigarettes were not defective. 66
60. Prosser, Strict Liability to the Consumer in California, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 9, 23 (1966).
61. Cronin, 8 Cal. 3d at 132, 501 P.2d at 1161-62, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 441-42.
62. Id. at 133, 501 P.2d at 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442. In support of this conclusion,
the court cited the following: Rheingold, Proof of Defect in Product Liability Cases, 38 TENN.
L. REv. 325, 326 n.5 (1971); Keeton, Products Liability-Some Observations About Allocation
of Risks, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1329, 1340-41 (1966); Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers,
19 Sw. L.J. 5, 15 (1965); Prosser, The Assault on the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1119
(1960); Note, Products Liability and Section 402A of the Restatement of Torts, 55 GEo. L.J.
286, 323 (1966).
63. Cronin, 8 Cal. 3d at 133, 501 P.2d at 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442.
64. Id. at 135, 501 P.2d at 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 443.
65. Scholars quickly tried to fill the gap left by Cronin by proposing definitions of
"defective" that would preserve products liability as a species of strict liability. See, e.g.,
Keeton, supra note 17 at 30; Wade, supra note 38, at 825.
66. The comments to section 402A are also of little help. Comment g suggests that a
product is in a "defective condition" when it is "in a condition not contemplated by the
ultimate consumer." Comment i then suggests that a product is "unreasonably dangerous"
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Having declared in Cronin that products liability must avoid the
"ring of negligence," the court in Barker v. Lull Engineering Co.67
started the bells ringing again while simultaneously proclaiming ad-
herence to Cronin. The trial judge in Barker had instructed the jury
"that strict liability for a defect in design of a product is based on
a finding that the product was unreasonably dangerous for its in-
tended use.' '68 This instruction was completely at odds with the
holding in Cronin, and the California Supreme Court reversed the
trial court in the first two paragraphs of the opinion. 69
But the court went much further in Barker. In extended dicta
covering the remaining fifty-three paragraphs, the court tried to
explain what instructions should be given to the jury in a products
liability action. The court recognized that its decision in Cronin had
left lower courts confused about what instructions to give to the
jury. In particular, some lower courts had interpreted Cronin as a
direction to leave the term "defect" essentially undefined for the
jury. The supreme court used Barker to give "defect" a definition:
[W]e have concluded ... that a product is defective in design either
(1) if the product has failed to perform as safely as an ordinary
consumer would expect when used in an intended or reasonably
foreseeable manner, or (2) if, in light of the relevant factors
discussed below, the benefits of the challenged design do not out-
weigh the risk of danger inherent in such design.70
The ordinary consumer test is taken from the Restatement itself
and embodies the basic notion that consumers should be entitled to
rely upon ordinary expectations in product behavior and quality. The
court admitted that the test was "somewhat analogous to the Uniform
Commercial Code's warranty of fitness and merchantability . .. ,
[and] reflects the warranty heritage upon which California product
liability doctrine in part rests. ' '71 Of course it is really more than
just "somewhat analogous." It is the same approach; the difference,
when it is "dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary
consumer who purchases it." These two tests are essentially identical, and Professor Dickerson
may have been correct when he suggested at the debates over 402A that "defective condition"
and "unreasonably dangerous" are really interchangeable. See supra text accompanying notes
46-49.
67. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
68. Barker, 20 Cal. 3d at 417, 573 P.2d at 446, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 228.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 418, 573 P.2d at 446, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 228.
71. Id. at 429-30, 573 P.2d at 454, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 236 (citing CAL. COM. CODE § 2314
(West 1964)).
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if any, is in name only. Thus, half of the Barker formulation is
warranty-based.
The risk-benefit test-the other half of the Barker formulation-
is of course nothing more than negligence and nothing more than
Section 402A's "unreasonably dangerous" test.7 2 That can most
clearly be seen by looking at the "relevant factors" that the supreme
court directed juries to consider:
[A] jury may consider, among other relevant factors, the gravity of
the danger posed by the challenged design, the likelihood that such
danger would occur, the mechanical feasibility of a safer alternative
design, the financial cost of an improved design, and the adverse
consequences to the product and to the consumer that would result
from an alternative design.
73
This paragraph of course has a very familiar ring to it. Here is
what Judge Learned Hand had to say in a slightly different context:
Since there are occasions when every vessel will break from her
moorings, and, since, if she does, she becomes a menace to those
about her, the owner's duty, as in other similar situations, to provide
against resulting injuries is a function of three variables: (1) The
probability that she will break away; (2) the gravifty of the resulting
injury, if she does; (3) the burden of adequate precautions. 74
If there is any difference between Barker's test and Hand's test,
it lies only in the fact that the Barker formulation nominally focuses
"on the adequacy of the product itself, rather than on the manufac-
turer's conduct. ' 75 The focus is nominal only, however, since the
72. It has also been pointed out that the consumer expectation test may not be conceptually
distinct from the risk-benefit test, but may, instead, be a "different formulation" of the same
test. Powers, The Persistence of Fault in Products Liability, 61 TEx. L. Rv. 777, 794 (1983).
73. Barker, 20 Cal. 3d at 431, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
74. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). As Professors
Calabresi and Hirschoff noted:
Despite the courts' recognition that strict liability must be limited, they have seldom
been very confident in trying to describe the limits. Indeed, their efforts at answering
the questions posed in strict liability cases seem in many cases to degenerate into
either meaningless semantic disputes or attempts at balancing the costs of the accident
against the costs of avoiding it; yet the latter approach sounds devilishly like the
very calculus of negligence, or Learned Hand's test for fault, which strict liability
was meant to replace.
Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055, 1056
(1972).
75. Barker, 20 Cal. 3d at 432, 573 P.2d at 456, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 238. Professor Keeton,
among others, has proposed that the products risk-benefit test may be distinguished from a
negligence balancing by focusing in the products case on the state of knowledge at the time
of trial rather than the time of sale of the product (which would be the appropriate time
under a negligence analysis). See, e.g., Keeton, Products Liability and the Meaning of Defect,
supra note 17, at 37-38; Keeton, Products Liability-Inadequacy of Information, supra note
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product exists only by virtue of the manufacturer's conduct.76 Even
though the manufacturer may have spent thousands or millions of
dollars on product design and employed the best designers available,
if the ultimate product fails the balancing test set forth above, then
the manufacturer has negligently introduced a defective product into
the stream of commerce. It has never been a defense to unreasonable
conduct that the defendant tried very hard not to be unreasonable.
7
A good heart and a clean mind are no bar to liability for unreasonable
conduct.
The inconsistency between Cronin and Barker was perfectly obvious
to the Supreme Court of California. In order to avoid the catcalls
of commentators, the coui-t created-virtually out of whole cloth-
a real difference between products liability and negligence:
Because most of the evidentiary matters which may be relevant to
the determination of the adequacy of a product's design under the
'risk-benefit' standard-e.g., the feasibility and cost of alternative
designs-are similar to issues typically presented in a negligent design
case and involve technical matters peculiarly within the knowledge
of the manufacturer, we conclude that once the plaintiff makes a
prima facie showing that the injury was proximately caused by the
product's design, the burden should appropriately shift to the
defendant to prove, in light of the relevant factors, that the product
is not defective.7"
17, at 407-08. See generally, Wade, On the Effect in Product Liability of Knowledge Unavailable
Prior to Marketing, supra note 3, at 761-64 (reviewing Keeton's position). One clear implication
of this proposal would be to make a state-of-the-art defense unavailable in a products action.
See, e.g., Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982). So far,
however, the California courts have not been particularly receptive to this idea and have
recognized the relevance of state-of-the-art evidence. See, e.g., Rosburg v. Minnesota Min. &
Mfg. Co., 181 Cal. App. 3d 726, 735, 226 Cal. Rptr. 299, 305-06 (1986); McLaughlin v.
Sikorsky Aircraft, 148 Cal. App. 3d 203, 210, 195 Cal. Rptr. 764, 767 (1983).
76. See Powers, supra note 72, at 791-794.
77. Escola is itself a paradigm application of this principle. The manufacturer claimed
that it had done all it reasonably could have done to inspect the bottle to insure that it would
not explode. The court's response shows just how unnecessary strict liability is in a products
case:
It is true that defendant presented evidence tending to show that it exercised
considerable precaution by carefully regulating and checking the pressure in the
bottles and by making visual inspections for defects in the glass at several stages
during the bottling process. It is well settled, however, that when a defendant
produces evidence to rebut the inference of negligence which arises upon application
of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, it is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury
to determine whether the inference has been dispelled.
Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co, 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (1944). In other
words, we can trust the jury to do the right thing.
78. Barker, 20 Cal. 3d at 431, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
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Thus Barker succeeded in altering one of the most basic rules of
trial procedure: that the plaintiff has the burden of proving its case.
Of course, changing the burden of proof is not unprecedented. The
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is based on precisely such a burden
shifting. What Barker did, however, was to employ the results of res
ipsa loquitur-that the burdenwould shift to the defendant-without
requiring that the traditional elements of res ipsa loquitur be satis-
fied. 7 9
The most fundamental requirement for the application of res ipsa
loquitur is that the event must be of a kind that ordinarily does not
occur in the absence of the defendant's negligence. 0 Because of this
requirement, the doctrine could not be used generally for products
cases. According to Barker, the burden shifts once the plaintiff shows
the injury was caused by the design of the product, which means
that the plaintiff need only propose some alternative design that
would have avoided the accident. But no court could reasonably
conclude as a general matter that a manufacturer is ordinarily neg-
ligent for failing to adopt whatever alternative is proposed by plain-
tiff's counsel. Thus, the California Supreme Court could not use res
ipsa loquitur to shift the burden to the defendant in every products
case without damaging that doctrine. What it could do, however, is
indulge itself in the legal fiction that products liability is fundamen-
tally different from negligence and, in light of that fiction, simply
ignore traditional rules of proof. Without the shackles of those prior
rules, the court could create a new rule, shifting the burden of proof
to the defendant once the plaintiff shows the injury was caused by
the product's design. And the new rule was perfectly consonant with
one of the expressed purposes of products liability: "to relieve an
79. A similar burden shifting also occurs when courts employ the doctrine of negligence
per se. As Professor Wade observed, "The time will probably come when courts are ready to
declare that one who supplies a product which is unduly unsafe is negligent per se. Selling a
product which is not duly safe is negligence within itself, and no more needs to be proved.
Whether this is called negligence or strict liability is not really significant." Wade, supra note
38, at 850 (1973). It may not be significant to Professor Wade whether products liability is
grounded in negligence or strict liability, since Professor Wade does not react to the labels
alone. But the difference may well be important to courts that sometimes react simply to the
fact that products liability is supposed to be strict liability. See, e.g., Beshada v. Johns-
Manville Products Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 198, 447 A.2d 539, 546 (1982) (rejecting state-of-the-
art as a permissible defense primarily because it "is a negligence defense"); Cronin v. J.B.E.
Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 132, 501 P.2d 1153, 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 442 (1972) (rejecting
"unreasonably dangerous" test because it "rings of negligence").
80. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON ToRTs, § 39,
at 244 (5th ed. 1984).
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injured plaintiff of many of the onerous evidentiary burdens inherent
in a negligence cause of action."' 8
In Barker, the Supreme Court of California took the first steps
towards recognition that products liability was not very strict and
that the doctrine was being used primarily to circumvent troublesome
procedural rules. Having clearly stated a substantive test that incor-
porated a negligence-like balancing test and having clearly established
a procedural difference between a products case and other negligence
cases, the California court was prepared to take the next step-
recognize explicitly that products liability, at least in certain design
defect cases, should be negligence based.
D. The Drug Exception to Strict Products Liability
In the late 1970s and 1980s, California courts faced the DES cases.
The cases raised serious concerns about the ability of the tort system
to compensate injured persons in the context of mass torts. In Sindell
v. Abbott Laboratories,82 the Supreme Court of California, in an
opinion by Justice Mosk, gave the plaintiffs a significant victory by
allowing them to go forward even though no single plaintiff was
likely ever to be able to prove which defendant was liable for which
injury.
The procedural victory in Sindell was short-lived. When the merits
came before the Supreme Court again in Brown v. Superior Court
(Abbott Laboratories),83 the plaintiffs were dealt a serious blow. The
court held unanimously that the action could not go forward as a
strict products liability action and that the plaintiffs would have to
prove negligence on the manfacturer's part in order to recover.
81. Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 431, 573 P.2d 443, 455, 143 Cal. Rptr.
225, 237 (1978). Of course any rule that made it easier for the plaintiff to win would be
consistent with this policy, even a rule that imposed absolute liability.
It may be that there are good reasons to shift the burden of proof. But the only reasons
offered by the court in Barker were (1) the purpose of products liability is to make the
plaintiff's burden easier; and (2) the defendant's greater knowledge about the product design.
The first reason simply begs the question. Why should the plaintiff's burden be easier in a
products case as compared with any other type of negligence action? The second reason is at
odds with reality. In the first place, the plaintiff is hardly without some power in the matter.
The main purpose of pre-trial discovery is to give the plaintiff the chance to prove its case
based on what the defendant knows. In the second place, the court's rationale-that the
defendant is in a better position to prove its case-applies to every civil case in which the
defendant has superior knowledge-yet we will not soon see a general rule that the defendant
has the burden of proof on all matters about which the defendant has superior knowledge.
82. 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980).
83. 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 751 P.2d 470, 245 Cal. Rptr. 412 (1988).
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Brown would not be nearly so important if the court had simply
declared without much explanation that it was going to follow
comment k to Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
Other courts had followed that easy route. But Justice Mosk, the
author of Sindell, wrote a comprehensive and scholarly opinion-an
opinion that will quickly make its way into every torts casebook.
The starting point is comment k to Section 402A:
k. Unavoidably unsafe products. There are some products which,
in the present state of human knowledge, are quite incapable of
being made safe for their intended and ordinary use. These are
especially common in the field of drugs. An outstanding example
is the vaccine for the Pasteur treatment of rabies, which not
uncommonly leads to very serious and damaging consequences when
it is injected. Since the disease itself invariably leads to a dreadful
death, both the marketing and the use of the vaccine are fully
justified, notwithstanding the unavoidable high degree of risk which
they involve. Such a product, properly prepared, and accompanied
by proper directions and warning, is not defective, nor is it unrea-
sonably dangerous. The same is true of many other drugs, vaccines,
and the like, many of which for this very reason cannot legally be
sold except to physicians, or under the prescription of a physician.
It is also true in particular of many new or experimental drugs as
to which, because of lack of time and opportunity for sufficient
medical experience, there can be no assurance of safety, or perhaps
even of purity of ingredients, but such experience as there is justifies
the marketing and use of the drug notwithstanding a medically
recognizable risk. The seller of such products, again with the
qualification that they are properly prepared and marketed, and
proper warning is given, where the situation calls for it, is not to
be held to strict liability for unfortunate consequences attending
their use, merely because he has undertaken to supply the public
with an apparently useful and desirable product, attended with a
known but apparently reasonable risk.8A4
It is clear-and the Supreme Court of California recognized-that
comment k embodies a negligence standard.8 5 At the very least, then,
84. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A comment k.
85. Brown, 44 Cal. 3d at 1059, 751 P.2d at 475-76, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 417-18.
While there is some disagreement as to [comment k's] scope and meaning, there is
a general consensus that, although it purports to explain the strict liability doctrine,
in fact the principle it states is based on negligence. That is, comment k would
impose liability on a drug manufacturer only if it failed to warn of a defect of
which it either knew or should have known. This concept focuses not on a deficiency
in the product-the hallmark of strict liability-but on the fault of the producer in
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Brown stands for the proposition that as far as prescription drugs
are concerned, strict liability is not an available theory of recovery.1
6
Brown stands for much more however. As shown below, the court
employed a negligence-like balancing of interests in concluding that
strict liability did not apply. Negligence principles thus lay at the
very foundation of every products case in determining whether or
not strict liability should apply.
The court was very clear in Brown about its reasons for rejecting
strict liability. Justice Mosk explained that the social value to be
gained from both experimental and non-experimental drugs out-
weighed the risk of harm caused by side effects of those drugs. In
particular, the court held that "the broader public interest in the
availability of drugs at an affordable price must be considered in
deciding the appropriate standard of liability for injuries resulting
from their use."'  Because of that balance, it was inappropriate to
impose strict liability on prescription drug manufacturers.
Now any first year law student will recognize that Justice Mosk's
analysis is nothing more than an application of Judge Hand's bal-
ancing test from Carroll Towing. The benefit to be gained by the
manufacture of a product is balanced against the risk of injury to
the user of the product. And as a result of Mosk's analysis in Brown,
almost every lawyer defending a products case-whether or not it
involves prescription drugs-will now claim that strict liability should
not apply since the benefit to society created by the product outweighs
the risks inherent in the product's design." This argument will
undoubtedly go hand-in-hand with an argument that the market-
place, rather than the court, is the best place to determine what is
beneficial to society.
failing to warn of dangers inherent in the use of its product that were either known
or knowable-an idea which 'rings of negligence,' in the words of Cronin.
Id. (citations omitted). See, Schwartz, Unavoidably Unsafe Products, 42 WASH. & LE L.
R v. 1139, 1141 (1985); McClellan, Drug Induced Injury, 25 WAYNE L. REv. 1, 2 (1975);
Kidwell, Duty to Warn, 53 Tax. L. REv. 1375, 1377-1378 (1975); Merrill, Compensating Drug
Injuries, 59 VA. L. REv. 1, 50 (1973).
86. Brown, 44 Cal. 3d at 1061, 751 P.2d at 477, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 418.
87. Brown, 44 Cal. 3d at 1063, 751 P.2d 478-79, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 420.
88. It should be noted that this argument is really just an application of the balancing
test set forth in Barker, and it is therefore an argument that courts in California arc already
facing in design defect cases. See, e.g., Rosburg v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 181 Cal.
App. 3d 726, 226 Cal. Rptr. 299 (1986). There is a significant difference, however. In Barker,
the argument is made to the jury to prove that there is no defect; in Brown, the argument is
made to the court to take the case entirely out of Section 402A and put it squarely back into
negligence.
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The responses to these arguments can also be anticipated. The
argument that the marketplace should be determinative is premised,
in part, on the cost of the product reflecting the cost to society;
unless that cost includes the cost of injuries caused by the product,
the marketplace's decision may not be correct. This reply is over-
broad, of course, since it implies absolute liability rather than strict
liability, and even the Supreme Court of California never adopted
Justice Traynor's original suggestion of absolute liability. As already
noted, cases are legion where courts have proclaimed that manufac-
turers are not insurers of their products. 9
The second reply-and the one Justice Mosk set forth in his
opinion-is that prescription drugs are sui generis in the marketplace.
According to Justice Mosk, prescription drug manufacturers are
entitled to an exemption from strict products liability because (a)
prescription drugs "may be necessary to alleviate pain and suffering
or to sustain life" and (b) "harm to some users from prescription
drugs is unavoidable. "90 Justice Mosk used (a) to distinguish pre-
scription drugs from other products such as construction machinery,
lawnmowers, and perfumes-which are "used to make work easier
or to provide pleasure." 91 He used (b) to distinguish prescription
drugs from other life saving or pain avoiding devices, such as
wheelchairs.
Justice Mosk's test-whether (a) a product saves lives or is nec-
essary to alleviate pain and suffering and (b) is unavoidably unsafe-
has several difficulties. With respect to part (a), there are many
products other than prescription drugs that can easily be characterized
as necessary to save lives or alleviate pain and suffering. Justice
Mosk himself recognized that there are many health-related products
other than drugs that may alleviate pain and suffering. His example
of one such product was a wheelchair. We may add in the same
category crutches or casts. But this list is readily expandable to
virtually any product sold in the health-care aisle of the supermarket:
heating pads, cold creams to soothe sunburn, sun tan lotion, sun
glasses, creams or liquids to soothe cold sores or toothaches, athletes
foot spray or powder, hemorrhoid treatments, and so on. This health-
related list would also include equipment used by hospitals and
doctors in the diagnosis and treatmen(j"irocess, including X-ray
89. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
90. Brown, 44 Cal. 3d at 1063, 751 P.2d at 478, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 420.
91. Id.
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machines, heart monitors, heart and lung machines, and even am-
bulances and air rescue helicopters.
In the second place, it is a relatively short step from health-care
products to other products that improve our quality of living and,
by so doing, alleviate or prevent physical pain and suffering or save
lives. In their own way, the inventions of commercially available
electricity, the light bulb, the refrigerator, the automobile, and the
telephone have each contributed to the reduction of sickness and to
the saving of lives, perhaps much more directly and on a much
grander scale than the creation of certain drugs.
Moreover, it is not at all clear why products that provide pleasure
(using Justice Mosk's word) should be treated differently than prod-
ucts that reduce pain and suffering. Our world would surely be a
most dreary and insufferable place without those pleasure producing
products. Those products fill a genuine need in society, just as life-
saving drugs fill a genuine need. Can a court really say that the
invention of the Pasteur treatment for rabies is of greater good to
society than the invention of the telephone or automobile?
Finally, it is a cause for concern when a legal doctrine such as
strict products liability gives equal treatment to life-saving drugs and
such things as cigarettes and whiskey, especially when the underlying
rationale for the treatment is the same: society is generally aware
that these products may be dangerous. The fact is, however, that
every product carries with it the potential for harm, and society is
generally aware that the potential for harm exists in every product.
We should therefore be treating all products alike rather than trying
to distinguish before the fact the good or acceptably dangerous
products (that get special treatment) from all other products (that
get no special treatment).
As for part (b) of Mosk's test (that prescription drugs are una-
voidably unsafe), in another portion of the opinion, Justice Mosk
explains precisely why the unavoidably unsafe test is unsatisfactory.
In Kearl v. Lederle Laboratories,92 the court of appeals had proposed
that comment k be adopted only for "unavoidably unsafe" prescrip-
tion drugs as opposed to all prescription drugs. That limitation would
have been consistent with Prosser's view. In Brown, the supreme
court held that this modified form of comment k was unacceptable. 93
Justice Mosk acknowledged:
92. 172 Cal. App. 3d 812, 218 Cal. Rptr. 453 (1985).
93. Brown, 44 Cal. 3d at 1066-69, 751 P.2d at 481-82, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 423-24.
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It seems unjust to grant the same protection from liability to those
who gave us thalidomide as to the producers of penicillin. If some
method could be devised to confine the benefit of the comment k
negligence standard to those drugs that have proved useful to
mankind while denying the privilege to those that are clearly harm-
ful, it would deserve serious consideration. But we know of no
means by which this can be accomplished without substantially
impairing the public interest in th development and marketing of
new drugs, because the harm to this interest arises in the very
process of attempting to make the distinction.
94
In other words, if a court were allowed after the fact to determine
that a product was not unavoidably unsafe and that the product was
therefore subject to strict liability, that would undermine the result
reached in part (a) of Mosk's test-that the benefit to the public of
manufacturing the product outweighs the risk. The supreme court
thus rejected Kearl's distinction between unsafe prescription drugs
and unavoidably unsafe prescription drugs because such a distinction
is inconsistent with the policy determination made in part (a) of
Mosk's test.
That precise tension exists, however, between part (a) of Mosk's
test and part (b) of Mosk's test. Part (b) of his test-that "harm to
some users from prescription drugs is unavoidable"-is nothing more
than the "unavoidably unsafe" distinction suggested by the Kearl
court. Following Mosk's own rejection of Kearl, part (b) should be
rejected. If a determination is first made that the development and
marketing of a product is so important to society that its development
outweighs the injuries it causes, then a finding that a product is
avoidably unsafe would undermine the first determination that the
benefits of the product outweigh the harm.
Dean Prosser recognized more than 25 years ago that any attempt
to distinguish between drugs and other products was fraught with
peril. When ALI first considered the topic of prescription drugs and
Section 402A in 1961, Dean Prosser made the following observations
against the inclusion of the concept embodied in comment k:
My problem-and please understand me, that I am in sympathy
with you, sir-is: How do you distinguish between the new exper-
imental drugs, the cure which somebody will come up with, no
doubt, inside of the next fifteen years which will actually cure
cancer, of which there will be an enormous sale on the market and
94. Id. at 1067, 751 P.2d at 481, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 423.
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which will undoubtedly kill its thousands-how do you distinguish
that from a new hair dye or shaving lotion which should not be on
the market?
You may remember some years ago-and I am sure you do-the
depilatories, the surplus hair removers, which were put on the
market. Somebody had discovered that thallium acetate would re-
move hair, which it will. It will also blind the patient and drive
him crazy, and several other things.
Now, I think today that any court would hold that anybody that
put that stuff on the market assumed the responsibility, and in the
hair remover case you would have no trouble applying the rule of
this case. Give me language which will take care of your perfectly
decent medical experiment with new drugs in order to save human
life which will not include the thallium acetate hair remover.95
Prosser was right. There is no elegant way to distinguish between
prescription drugs, all drugs, and other products such as "hair dye
and shaving lotion." And as Prosser also noted, there is no easy
way to distinguish between food and items for intimate bodily use,
which the original draft of Section 402A covered, and products
generally, which the final draft covered. In fact, the overnight
expansion of products liability from food to all products itself
suggests that no elegant distinction can be drawn.
III. CONCLUSION
Following the logic of the above, the next step should be to apply
the risk-benefit analysis of Brown to all products liability cases. We
would then have come full circle. Products liability would have been
created initially as something distinct from negligence and warranty
but would have ended up being recognized as the same as negligence
and warranty. Only the troublesome procedural rules would have
changed. This would be a wise step in the author's opinion. We
should guard against the temptation to force products liability to be
something different from negligence and warranty simply to justify
applying different rules to a products liability action than to any
other negligence or warranty action.
It seems likely, however, that that next logical step will not be
taken anytime soon. Courts have been more comfortable indulging
95. 38th ALI PROCEEDINGS, supra note 44, at 93-94. See also Smith v. Denholm & McKay
Co., 288 Mass. 234, 192 N.E. 631 (1934) (the hair remover case apparently referred to by
Prosser).
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in the fiction that products liability is not negligence than facing the
reality that the rules of the game were being changed in spite of the
fundamental similarity between a negligence action and a products
action.
Eventually, however, some courageous court will take the fateful
step of pronouncing strict products liability to be a dead letter. As
Professor Wade declared fifteen years ago, "At that time we would
have a single cause of action which combines the desirable attributes
of the three types of action that are now available." 96 And the world
of torts will keep spinning, because that court would also declare
that the innovations wrought by the creation of strict products
liability are well justified and so firmly rooted in the law that they
cannot be excised.
96. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 850
(1973). See also Wade, On the Effect in Product Liability of Knowledge Unavailable Prior to
Marketing, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 734 (1983).

